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BOOK
Calabresian Sunset: Statutes in the Shade
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES. By Guido Calabresi.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982. Pp. 319. $25.00.
Reviewed by Allan C. Hutchinson* and Derek Morgan**
I have a horror of sunsets; they are so romantic, so operatic.

Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past***
Guido Calabresi is a juristic pioneer. In all his writings, he has operated
on the frontiers of legal thought. His work has been described as the "recasting, in a stimulating and innovative way, [of] the concerns and doctrines of
the common law." ' His major field of endeavor has been the law of torts, to
which he has made a unique contribution. In his most recent publication, A
Common Law for the Age of Statutes,2 based on the Oliver Wendell Holmes
lectures he delivered at Harvard in March of 1977, Professor Calabresi has
brought his ample juristic talents to bear on a foundational problem of the
legal and democratic process. He has produced a monograph that in its
quality, timeliness and provocativeness is likely to stand alongside the seminal
works of Ronald Dworkin and Grant Gilmore. With characteristic pragmatism and candor, he offers a solution to the "orgy of statute making ' 3 that
currently swamps the American system of governance. Statutes is not intended

to be a final solution; it is "no more than a start" (p. 3). If Calabresi's hope is

*Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Canada. Barrister (Gray's Inn).
L.L. B. 1974, L.L. M. 1978, Osgoode Hall Law School.
**Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Newcastle University, England. B.A. 1976, Faculty of Law,
Newcastle University, England.
We are grateful to Newcastle law students Jennifer Tedder and Jane Toft for their research
assistance. Also we would like to thank'Dick Markovits of the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies,
Oxford, Tom Hervey of Warwick Law School, and Dan Prentice of Pembroke College, Oxford,
for their comments on an earlier draft. Errors, omissions, and opinions remain entirely our own.
***2 M. Proust, Remembrance of Things Past 840-41 (C.K. Scott Moncrieff trans., T.
Kilmartin ed. 1981).
1. Elliott, Book Review, 44 Mod. L. Rev. 345, 345 (1981) (reviewing G. Calabresi & P.
Bobbitt, Tragic Choices (1978)). From the publication of his first essay in 1961, Some Thoughts
on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961), Calabresi has maintained a
steady stream of important publications. In addition to his many articles in scholarly journals, his
major contributions have been The Costs of Accidents (1970) and, with Philip Bobbitt, Tragic
Choices (1978).
2. It is interesting to observe that, in an earlier article, Calabresi referred to his forthcoming
book as The Common Law Function in the Age of Statutes. See Calabresi, The Nonprimacy of
Statutes Act: A Comment, 4 Vt. L. Rev. 247, 247 (1979).
3. G. Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 95 (1977).
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simply to initiate a public debate about the "dark places" of statutory petri-

fiction (p. 180), it can be confidently reported that Statutes will stimulate such
discussion. Indeed, it is likely to provide a benchmark against which other

proposals can be evaluated. Nevertheless, despite the clarity of insight exhibited in Statutes, we intend to take up Calabresi's invitation and, in a modest

way, offer some critical responses to his thesis of judicial sunsetting. First, we
will examine the increasingly disturbing problem of statutory obsolescence.

Then, after a theoretical appraisal of the democratic legitimacy of Calabresi's
proposal, we will evaluate the efficiency of his thesis. Finally, Calabresi's

arguments and our criticisms of them will be put to a practical test in the
context of a recent, controversial Supreme Court decision.
I. THE AGE OF STATUTORY POLLUTION
The distinguishing feature of twentieth-century legal history has been the
shift from the common law to statutes as the major source of law. In the final
decades of this century, it can be reported that, while the common law

tradition of deciding cases is arguably still the major characteristic of the
common law as a source of lav has been
Anglo-American judicial process, the
4
relegated to a secondary position.
By 1947, Justice Frankfurter could claim that the number of controver-

sies before the Supreme Court that did not involve a statute had declined to
almost zero. 5 In the 1961-1962 Congress, 20,316 bills were introduced and
more than 1,000 public bills were passed.6 In 1975, more than 26,000 bills
were laid before Congress, and in the California legislature alone more than
7,000 bills were introduced." The New York legislature of 1977-1978 had to
contend with nearly 40,000 new legislative proposals, of which 1,758 were
enacted. 8 The channels of the legal process are steadily becoming blocked by
this deluge of statutes. Regrettably, legislatures have been far more willing to

enact statutes than to monitor the performance and continued pertinence of
the enactments. The American legal process is straining under the weight of
4. Aldisert, The Nature of the Judicial Process: Revisited, 49 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 48 (1980).
Although the proliferation of statutes has reached epidemic proportions in only the past twenty
years, its occurrence and the problems it gives rise to were prophesied in the late 1920's and early
1930's. For instance, in 1930 Max Radin opined that "Anglo-American law is in a fair way of
becoming statutory ... by the relentless annual or biennial grinding of more than fifty legislative
machines." Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 863 (1930). See also, e.g.,
Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in Harvard Legal Essays 213 (1934), and Stone, The
Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1936). For an even earlier sighting of this
problem, see Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (1908).
5. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 527
(1947).
6. Humphrey, To Move Congress Out of Its Ruts, N.Y. Times, April 7, 1963, § 4 (magazine), at 129.
7. Ehrlich, Legal Pollution, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1976, § 6 (magazine), at 17, reprinted in
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice-Resource Materials 47 (1976). See generally Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescence:
The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, 4 Vt. L. Rev. 203, 209 n.24 & 212 n.34 (1979) (discussing growth
in the size of Minnesota Statutes).
8. R. Neely, How Courts Govern America 56 (1981).
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obsolete statutes, and legislatures have proved unwilling or unable to alleviate
the burden; "the two most important forces in political life are indifference
and its direct byproduct, inertia." 9 It is this legislative inertia that Calabresi
addresses and seeks to circumvent by a novel theory of judicial sunsetting.
The tension flowing from the courts' struggle to iriterpret and enforce
statutes is at the heart of the legal process. Throughout American history,
differing interpretations have been placed upon the doctrine of the separation
of powers, 10 and upon the force and nature of the obligations and responsibilities it imposes on each branch of government." During most of the nineteenth
century, the relationship was dynamic and fruitful. It was a "Golden Age" in
which the courts addressed social issues and sought to resolve them in instrumental ways.12 It was not until the later decades of that century that the courts
began to take a wholly formal approach to the judicial function whereby "an
abstraction dictates, objectively, apolitically, in a non-discretionary fashion, a
particular result.' 31 By the Second World War, it was accepted that abstract
rationality could not account for judicial decisions; it masked the inescapable
exercise of judicial choice. Yet, while legal reasoning is viewed as purposive
and instrumental, there has not been a return to the political pluralism of the
early nineteenth century. The present age is characterized by doubt and anxi-

9. Id. at 25.
10. Anglo-American courts accept and uphold the dictates of constitutional democracy at
the core of which lies the doctrine of the separation of powers, despite early attempts by the courts
to gain the law-making and law-validating initiative, namely, the struggle between Parliament and
the Court of Common Pleas, headed by Sir Edward Coke, for political supremacy in the early
seventeenth century. As his famous dicta in Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 107, 118, 77 Eng.
Rep. 638, 652 (1610), make clear, Coke's objective was to create for the courts the power to
countermand the duly enacted statutes of Parliament:
In many Cases, the Common Law will controll Acts of Parliament, and sometimes
adjudge them to be utterly void: For when an Act of Parliament is against Common
Right and Reason, ... the Common Law will controll it.
This differs from Calabresi's plea for a judicial-legislative colloquy. See infra text following note
30.
11. For accounts of such shifts and comments on the history of American legal thought
generally, see, e.g., G. Gilmore, supra note 3; K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (1960);
P. Nonet & P. Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law (1978); L. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law (1978); G. E. White, Patterns of American Legal Thought (1978);
and Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976).
12. See G. Gilmore, supra note 3, at 19-40; see also M. Horwitz, The Transformation of
American Law, 1780-1860 (1977); R. Unger, Law in Modern Society (1976); Nelson, The Impact
of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America,
87 Harv. L. Rev. 513 (1974).
13. Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of
Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 Research in L. & Soc. 3, 21 (1980). Although
there is general agreement about the fact that there was a move from instrumental to formalistic
reasoning, there is a wide divergence of opinion over the reasons for such a change. Some writers
such as Kennedy, id., and M. Horwitz, supra note 12, at 253-56, maintain that formalism was an
ideological construct utilized by the dominant classes, during the heyday of American capitalism,
to preserve and legitimate their power by neutralizing the redistributive potential of the law. Other
writers have striven to refute this analysis. See, e.g., G. E. White, Tort Law in America 3-4
(1980); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972); Schwartz, Tort Law and the
Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 Yale L.J. 1717 (1981).
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ety. The instrumentalism of judges remains tightly reined within a general
14
subservience to legislators as the proper guardians of fundamental values.
Within this relational context, several writers not only have grasped the

urgency of the problems arising from statutory obsolescence, but have made
tentative moves towards some kind of a solution. The leading proposals are to

be found in the works of Friendly, Gilmore and Davies. Friendly, drawing on
the suggestions of Pound1 5 and Cardozo,16 proposes the establishment of a
law revision commission as the cure for the statutory ailment.' 7 Believing that
the problem of excessive statutory obsolescence will resolve itself,', Gilmore

places his faith in the healing powers of codification.' 9 Davies, in contrast,
advocates the more novel and formal solution of legislative sunsetting with a
new penumbral punch. He proposes the introduction of a general statute that
permits the courts to modify and overrule statutes after a period of twenty
20
years has elapsed.
Calabresi prefers to wipe the slate clean. He is generous with his praise

for these scholars, but rejects their proposals on both theoretical and pragmatic grounds. He finds Friendly's support for a revisionary agency misplaced. Because such agencies have power to recommend change, but no
authority to implement it (pp. 63-64), their efficacy depends ultimately on
legislative enactment. Yet it is precisely the legislature's constrained activity
that has given birth to the agency. Gilmore's codification solution does not
meet the problem head-on; a code is merely a special type of statute and will
itself "fall out of date" (p. 83). Although Calabresi is effusive in his commendation of Davies, 2 he nevertheless feels that any imposition of a time-based
sunset is self-defeating. It will catch some statutes that we would wish to

14. There is very little agreement on the positive accomplishments of this modern period. See
G. Gilmore, supra note 3, at 12, 68-98. For instance, Kennedy concludes that "we live not in a
time of return to the sound practice of 1830, but in a post-Classical age of disintegration."
Kennedy, supra note 13, at 5. Mark Tushnet is of the opinion that there is a new breed of neoconceptualism emerging in the wake of realist scholarship. Tushnet, Post-Realist Scholarship, 15
J. Soc'y Pub. Tchrs. L. 20 (1980). A similar, although ideologically different, line is taken by G.
Edward White, see G. E. White, supra note 13, at 211-43. Finally, Karl Klare takes the view that
modern legal thought is a chaotic amalgam of different styles: a jurisprudential melange in which
contrasting and antagonistic styles are simultaneously and unreflectively employed. See Klare,
Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,
1937-1941, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 334-36 (1978).
15. See Pound, Anachronisms, Law, 3 J. Am. Judicature Soc'y 142, 145-46 (1919).
16. See Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 114 (1921).
17. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63
Colum. L. Rev. 787, 802-07 (1963).
18. G. Gilmore, supra note 3, at 96.
19. Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. Colo. L. Rev. 461 (1967).
20. Davies, supra note 7, at 204.
21. See Calabresi, supra note 2, at 255. Indeed, Calabresi's praise seems overplayed since he
rejects the reform Davies has proposed:
He has painted a great canvas in its particulars as well as in its broad conception. If it is
true that the Venetian style emphasizes color and outlook, but underplays detail,
whereas the Florentine glories in detail and precision but sometimes shades the broader
vision, Davies' painting combines the best of Venice and Florence.

1756

COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1752

survive and fall to catch others that ought properly to be examined much
earlier; "time does not serve as a good indicator of age ...

in all statutes" (p.

62).
Statutes is devoted to propounding a novel theory of judicial sunsetting.

Anachronistic laws, whether statutory or judicial, must be eradicated. "Legislative inertia ...

[is] a fact of life" (p. 34). Consequently, judges should be

entitled to rework legislative enactments to keep them in line with the current
social and legal landscafpe. This is no more than the courts are already doing,

albeit by subterfuge. Furthermore, although "this proposal may appear to be
radical[, i]t is ... conservative of traditional American legal-political values"
(p. 2). Calabresi's presentation of this controversial thesis meets the very
highest standards of scholarly exposition. He combines lucidity and eloquence
with enthusiasm and rigor; his book is as compelling as it is important.22 Yet
its success requires qualification.
II. CALABRESlAN SUNSET
As Calabresi himself admits (p. 82), his theory is easy to state in summary
form, but difficult to explain in convincing detail. Having identified the
problem of statutory obsolescence, he surveys the past judicial solutions,

bureaucratic responses, and possible legislative reforms. 23 He concludes that a

22. This is meant as more than mere hyperbole or hollow praise. Statutes is much more
readable than Tragic Choices which, in spite of its originality, is dense and difficult in parts. In
style and turn of phrase, Statutes is reminiscent of R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1979).
23. Alternative attempts to deal with statutory obsolescence have been made through a
variety of non-judicial mechanisms. Calabresi focuses his critical attention upon administrative
agencies, quasi-legislative bodies and two particular structural reforms. All of these options share
one central tenet: the arrival of the "statutory state" (p. 69). Only one of the two structural
reforms does not seek to work wholly within the framework of the "statutory state." It envisages
instead a return to the golden age of the common law, a time when common law courts were the
main agencies for modernization of the law. Calabresi dismisses this as unrealistic nostalgia. In a
particularly punishing comment, he states that
[t]he orgy of statute-making has not occurred by chance, even if its total effect has
been to an extraordinary degree unintended and unself-conscious. . . . [T]he move to
statutorification . . . becomes irreversible once the first statutory step is taken.... The
very fact that statutorification has occurred at an increasing pace . . . is the best
argument against thinking we can reverse the trend. (Pp. 73, 78, 79.)
The heyday of the common law is dead and gone. To hanker after such past glories is both futile
and dangerous.
The second structural response advocates wide-ranging reforms of the legislative procedure.
While such reforms would serve to shape the structure and philosophy of American government
to fit the new statutory state, they would initiate the wholesale reallocation of political power in a
way that the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers would prohibit. Moreover, "the
unknowns of such reforms are too great" (p. 72). The choice for obsolete laws is preferable to
such radical, constitutional reformation.
Calabresi's response to the administrative agency as a forum for law updating finds sympathy in contemporary analysis. Although an agency is initially perceived as a threat by those whom
it has been established to regulate, the agency and its regulations will, over time, serve to protect
existing interests and work as a barrier for those seeking to enter established markets (p. 47).
Having accomplished their initial regulatory task, agencies become risk-averse. Innovation gives
way to inertia. They are touched by "the same political forces that militate in favour of legislative
inertia." Peltzman, The Benefits and Costs of New Drug Regulation, in Regulating New Drugs
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judicial solution is the least-worst alternative. Indeed, he implies that it has
"already been commonly used without explicit recognition" (p. 190 n.31) and
that there is nothing deeply inconsistent with the practice of democratic
government in this. Finally, he explores some of the difficulties of his proposal, paying especial attention to the question of whether the "honest and
selfconscious adoption of a new, possibly far-reaching doctrine" (id.) is preferable to "continuing to use unselfconscious and occasionally uncandid or
dishonest alternatives" (id.). With some reservations, he opts for candor.
A. Judge-Made Law
If limits did not exist on judicial behaviour, it might be hard to
justify a system that gave courts conditional power to make common law rules. But once such a power was taken for granted, it
would be almost impossible to explain why it should not permit
courts to force reconsideration of old statutes. (P. 256 n.37.)
Judges are either elected or appointed and ratified by elected officials.
Although judges are relatively free from immediate and direct political pressure, long-term political awareness and acceptability forms one outward
boundary on the discharge of the judicial function. In fulfilling their adjudicative task, judges are required to be personally disinterested in the outcome of
each case. Furthermore, judges are relatively numerous and it takes many of
them to act effectively in shaping the law. Accordingly, the growth of the

208 (Landau ed. 1973) (quoted by Calabresi at p. 222 n. 19). Calabresi points out that administrative agencies do not have self-executing legislative powers. Their proposals are channelled back
into the legislative process, which is itself clogged by the dust of inertia. Moreover, when the
"comparative institutional capacity to deal with anachronistic laws" (p. 51) of such agencies is
assessed, they come out very badly. The difficulty with which agencies would be faced in an
attempt to detect shifts in majoritarian demands make them unsuitable trustees of the power to
initiate a reconsideration of timeworn laws (p. 51). It is not clear why this para-constitutional
argument holds more validity than objections to Calabresi's proposed thesis; especially when
Calabresi holds that possible constitutional objections to his thesis ought not to be taken "very
seriously" (p. 114).
Finally, to allow the growth of such an amorphous fourth branch of government would
grievously offend "the basic theory of the American Constitution that there should be three
major branches of the government and only three." President's Committee on Administrative
Management, Administrative Management in the United States 36 (1937) (quoted by Calabresi at
p. 219 n.6).
Suggestions for legislative responses to statutory obsolescence range from the indexing of
pecuniary sums given in statutes to proposals for the legislative sunsetting of old laws. To
Calabresi, such devices seem a clumsy way of solving the problem. The fundamental difficulty
with such alternatives is that they do not guarantee "that a current majority will rule or that only
anachronistic laws will fail to be re-enacted" (p. 61). Hence, the approach of the automatic
sunsetters is both too radical and too mechanical. In essense, legislative sunsetting does not pay
sufficient respect to the conservative tradition of American democracy. For this reason, Calabresian sunsetting requires that courts observe a "retentionist" bias in the fabric of the law (pp.
123-24). Under Calabresi's proposed regime, the courts would only be able to initiate the judiciallegislative colloquy after they had appraised the particular factors that have caused the law to fall
out of fit.
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common law is carried out on an accretional, case-by-case basis (pp. 94-95);
the courts respond to a "delayed popular will" (p. 96), acting rationally and
within the bounds of principles. These principles weave together to form the
"legal fabric" (p. 96). While the legal fabric is not an exact fit with prevailing
majoritarian preferences, it sufficiently reflects majoritarian desires so as to
be an appropriate starting point for lawmaking (p. 97). Judges are selected
and promoted for their ability to gauge this popular will. Their primary task is
to hand down principled decisions within the limits of the legal fabric. Those
elevated to judicial office are qualified to discern the nature and texture of the
fabric and to identify those laws which are out of fit with the overall weave. In
this way the judiciary can keep the law up to date so that the fabric "can be a
more accurate reflection of the popular desire" (p. 98). Having outlined this
traditional role of the common law judge, Calabresi advances to the exciting
and stimulating thesis that it should make no difference whether the law that
does not fit the fabric is a judge-made rule or a statutory enactment. All law
becomes out of date; yesterday's majoritarian preferences may not be today's.
In advocating his theory of judicial sunsetting, Calabresi proposes that
the courts should have the authority to determine whether a statute is "obsolete." For Calabresi's purposes, a statute may be considered to be obsolete
when a legislature would not now re-enact its provisions (pp. 121-23).24 In
such circumstances, Calabresi argues that there should be two courses of
action open to the court. Either it should be recognized openly that the court
may treat the statute as it would any part of the judge-made common law, or
it should be given the power to induce a legislature to reconsider an obsolete
statute (p. 2). Rules of law are not immutable. If anything, it is the methodological techniques by which rules of law are manipulated that approach
immutability. If the guiding principle of the common law is that like cases
should be treated alike, statutes and the common law should receive like
treatment (p. 86). A late nineteenth century statute may have as little to tell us
today as the opinion of an early twentieth century judge. Given the political
fact of legislative inertia (p. 34), Calabresi urges that the over-arching and
thoroughly democratic objective in all cases in which the courts use their
sunsetting powers would "be to permit the courts to keep anachronistic laws
from governing us" (p. 2). In short, Calabresi's work is devoted to reestablishing a symbiotic judicial-legislative colloquy25 in which the courts
would have the responsibility of keeping the law functional and up-to-date,
without infringing upon the ultimate initiative of the legislature in lawmaking
(pp. 3-7).

24. It is in this rather special sense, common to most modern American political rhetoric,
that the term "majoritarian" is used throughout Statutes (e.g., p. 186 n.13). Popular will is
equated not with an aggregation of individual citizens' preferences, but with an aggregation of
their representatives' views.
25. Calabresi's choice of "colloquy" to describe the court-legislature relationship has had an
interesting etymology. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries a colloquy was an
assembly of the Presbyterian polity. It fulfilled the functions both of a legislature and a court.
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B. The Choicefor Candor
A major thrust of Calabresi's thesis is that, while its adoption would
involve "some significant changes in our legal-political system" (p. 166), it
would merely "be recognizing the changes, not making them" (id.). Consequently, the earlier part of Statutes is devoted to a critical examination of
techniques that are currently used or advocated to deal with statutory obsolescence. Among the more favored techniques have been a resort to straightforward constitutional adjudication, a modification of Bickel's "passive virtues," 26 and a dynamic use of statutory interpretation.2 7 Although each device
has particular difficulties, a crucial drawback of all these approaches is that
they require the courts to engage in subterfuge. This is an exercise that may be
both too broad and too narrow in scope. In some instances the resort to
subterfuge will give the courts too powerful a discretion over statutes, and in
others it will leave the courts unable to reach obsolete laws. More importantly,
the general use of subterfuge corrupts its usefulness in a particular, limited
class of cases involving constitutional issues: "[t]he Supreme Court must
occasionally lie; the courts by and large should not" (p. 179). It is only in
those cases where there is a "fundamental value conflict, recognition of which
would be too destructive for the particular society to accept" (p. 172), that the
choice for candor may have to be abandoned. 2 8 In other words, Calabresi
would countenance the resort to subterfuge in cases in which absolutes would
produce results that a society would not wish to countenance. 2 9
C. The Judicial-LegislativeColloquy
For Calabresi, the ever-increasing outpourings of legislatures, the activities of judges in making common law adjudications, jury decisions, administrative determinations, and scholarly criticisms all combine to give shape and
color to the legal fabric (p. 98). It makes no sense to Calabresi that, when
judges consider whether any part of the law is out of fit with the fabric,
statutes should be excluded. Even though statutes represent the expression of
some era's majoritarian preferences, the court should be free to treat such
statutes with the same skepticism as any other part of the law. Calabresi insists
that this is not because judges can legislate better than legislators, but because,
26. See, e.g., A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics 98-111 (1962); Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1957); Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 TermForeword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961).
27. See, e.g., H. Hart and A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law (MS 1958); R. Keeton, Venturing to do Justice, Reforming Private Law 78-97
(1969); and Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes
on Adjudication, 83 Yale L.J. 221, 262-65 (1973). For a discussion of Calabresi's analysis of
nonadjudicative alternatives, see supra note 23.
28. Such choices form the central theme of Calabresi's earlier work with P. Bobbitt, Tragic
Choices (1978).
29. See, e.g., C. Black, Mr. Justice Black, The Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights,
Harper's Magazine, Feb. 1961, at 63 (discussing the "classical example" (Statutes p. 173) of a
subterfuge which relies on both justifications).
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acting in a principled and accretional manner, the courts are the least illequipped to set the starting points from which the legislative reconsideration
can take place (pp. 103-05).3o Calabresi makes it clear that "[o]ther things
being equal, old statutes remain in force" (p. 102). This conservative, or
"retentionist," bias in the law would remain. The objective of the courts
would be to stimulate a democratic dialogue:
[C]ourts... do not need to commit themselves so completely and
all at once. They can in cases of doubt use these techniques that
encourage legislatures, scholars, and even the public to engage them
in dialogue and give back data stronger than hunches. (P. 267 n.3.)
Calabresi does not expect the courts to work in the dark. Some statutes
may call for a "second" look either where there is asymmetry in the fit of the
statute or where the lack of fit is not currently favored by the legislature (pp.
129-38). A move from a "retentionist" to a "revisionist" bias may be appropriate where there have been changes around the statute, where the nature of
the statute advocates change, or where the statute now suffers from some
constitutional infirmity. Changes around the statute may result from technological, social, or intellectual advances. The statute may be out of fit with
other changes in the legal fabric. The consequences of applying the statute
may now be different from when it was passed. Some statutes are enacted as
"crisis laws" (p. 133), representing an ad hoc majoritarian response. Some,
when passed, are meant to be out of fit with the legal landscape. The "retentionist" bias would ensure that such statutes will remain in force unreviewed,
unless the courts find the "retentionist bias" unwarranted (p. 124). The
courts' authority to initiate a dialogue would be to guarantee that the clash
with the fabric is the result of "the genuine and considered wishes of majoritarian bodies" (p. 136). While the "retentionist bias" is particularly strong
with respect to more recent statutes, the mere age of a statute is not decisive
(p. 132).
Professor Calabresi relies on a judge's ability to assess all these general
factors and thereby determine whether there might exist a need to sunset the
statute. A host of specific factors are also relevant. The court's ability to use
these guidelines in assessing the fit of the statute makes the courts, in their
constrained reformatory role, the most acceptable agency to initiate a legislative reconsideration. The thesis is not a "nostalgic restoration of courts as the
primary makers of law" (p. 163). The court's common law function
is no more and no less than the critical task of deciding when a
retentionistor revisionist bias is appropriatelyapplied to an existing
30. Cf. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1979) (arguing structural reform litigation carries out function of adjudication: giving
meaning to public values). The whole notion that courts act in a principled and objective manner
has come under heavy "radical" attack. The Critical Legal Studies Movement, comprising such
figures as Kennedy, Tushnet, Klare, Gabel, and Unger, alleges that law is simply politics in
different garb. See Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics and the Critical Legal Scholars: The
Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought (1982) (unpublished manuscript on file at the
offices of the Columbia Law Review).
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statutory or common law rule. It is the judgmental function.., of
deciding when a rule has come to be sufficiently out of phase with
the whole legal framework so that, whatever its age, it can only
stand if a current majoritarian or representative body reaffirms it.
...
In carrying out this task the courts would ... be doing little
different from what they have traditionally done. Their main job
would still be to give us continuity and change by applying the great
vague principle of treating like cases alike. (Pp. 164-65.)
III. LONG DAY'S JouRNEY INTO NIGHT: IN SEARCH OF
CALABREsI's THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
The Calabresian thesis advocates a fundamental divesting of legislative
authority-a shift in the balance of political power from the legislature to the
judiciary. Acceptance of this proposal would constitute a significant change in
the politico-legal system. Yet, Calabresi argues, as this change has already
taken place (p. 166), its acceptance is merely a choice for candor. Notwithstanding this, it is a move that cannot be sanctioned until its democratic
propriety is thoroughly made out.
In an arresting phrase, Calabresi maintains that the objection of constitutional incompatibility is one that he "cannot take ... seriously" (p. 114). For
him, his thesis does not demand a democratically unwarranted delegation of
power. On the contrary, it is a delegation that would force legislatures to face
up to their democratic responsibilities. Nor does he accept that his proposal
"violates some general, structural notions of separation of powers" (p. 115).
Courts do make law and have always exercised power over statutes, albeit
through the use of subterfuge. How, then, can open recognition of their
authority threaten any of the aims and functions of the separation of powers?
A legal system that regards statutes as inviolable sources of law not only
deludes itself, but ill serves a democratic state. For Calabresi, the separationof-powers doctrine is functional not formal (p. 116). 31 The question is not
whether judges should make use of statutes, but how they should make
optimal use of them. 32 Yet Calabresi's very insistence on a "functional"
doctrine of separation of powers renders his thesis democratically illegitimate.
Surprisingly, Calabresi does not consider the elaboration of a deep theory
of liberal democracy to be a necessary requirement for his work in Statutes.

31. There is an echo here of R. Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 104
(1922): "Lawmaking, administration and adjudication cannot be rigidly fenced off one from the
other and turned over each to a separate agency as its exclusive field. There is rather a division of
labor as to typical cases and practical or historical apportionment of the rest." Cf. Fiss, supra
note 30, at 32 ("Traditional separation of powers doctrine assumes a differentiation of judicial
power from that of the executive and legislative branches, but it does not have to be alongformal
as opposed to functional lines, nor does it require that any branch be devoted to one function
alone."). See L. Tribe, supra note 11, at 15-426.
32. See Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 Cath. U.L. Rev. 401, 426
(1968). The "judicial lawmaking" debate is addressed in a recent summary and review by
Hoffmaster, Understanding Judicial Discretion, I Law and Phil. 21 (1982).
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Yet it is Calabresi who teaches us the importance and danger of starting
points. They can often affect end points and sometimes even become end
points (p. 52). Paradoxically, the starting point of his theory-i.e., the fact of
legislative inertia-gives rise to the major infirmity of the version of liberal
democracy implicit in Statutes. In view of legislative inertia, the starting
points that Calabresi would have the courts set are too near the logical end.
They blur the picture of the landscape that we are invited to contemplate.
Viewing the focused picture, one can see that the distortions in Calabresi's
picture are crucial. Accordingly, teasing the theoretical underpinnings from
the rhetoric of pragmatic advocacy becomes a vital task. Calabresi's approach
meets this blurred doctrine, not at its core, but in its penumbral regions. The
fundamental problem, he argues, must be to give statutes a "dynamic, relational intent" (p. 33) and nothing in constitutional theory requires courts to be
subservient to statutes long after the majoritarian basis on which they were
enacted has died. For Calabresi, the central question is quite simple: "Should
courts be allowed to force legislative reconsideration of anachronistic statutes
or even to nullify such statutes without thereby precluding subsequent legislative reconsideration?" (p. 25). His response, to retain legislative initiative in
lawmaking, while restoring to the courts their common law function of seeing
that the law is kept up to date (p. 7), is attractive but misleading.
A. Three Assumptions
Calabresi's response is premised on three assumptions about democratic
lawmaking. First, Calabresi assumes that courts enforce legislative enactments
because those enactments represent majoritarian wishes. Second, Calabresi
assumes that legislatures are required to act soberly (p. 26) or in a considered
fashion (p. 136). Finally, Calabresi assumes that legislative inertia is a fact of
life (p. 6) and, he implies, profoundly undemocratic. Each of these assumptions is of only questionable validity.
1. The MajoritarianBasis of Legislative Legitimacy. Calabresi asserts
that it is in the nature of the judicial task to see law as responsive to current
majorities, and as abhorring discrimination and special treatments not required by current majorities (p. 6). But this, of course, begs the fundamental
question of why courts enforce legislative enactments in the first place. Only
after answering this question satisfactorily can one see why courts may,
consistently with democratic theory, depart from their prima facie democratic
obligation; that is, that one may "come to accept this pragmatic boundary on
the court's subservience to the legal fabric" (p. 114).
Calabresi provides no explicit explanation of why courts enforce legislation at all. The most that can be gauged from Statutes is that where a statute is
duly enacted by the legislature, it represents majoritarian wishes. In some
sense, a statute is an expression of, or approximation to, the people's will (pp.
92-97) and, as such, merits enforcement. But this approach to legislation is
too simplistic. Many commentators remind us that popular sovereignty is a
more subtle idea than majoritarian wishes imply; democracy is much more
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than a commitment to popular sovereignty.33 The traditional view of the
legislative process ignores the bartering and horse-trading between the executive and the legislature. The process is, in fact, a complex transaction and
results in compromise legislation that would not be passed by the very same
legislature in the absence of those particular trade-offs. Much legislation
results from a process of logrolling and could not be said to reflect anything
that could be meaningfully called majority preference. In the legislative process, "popular sovereignty" is very attenuated indeed. Moreover, a view of
legitimacy as based on majoritarian preferences ignores that democracy involves a commitment to and belief in the integrity and importance of the
34
minority-a striving to safeguard its views and its rights.
2. The Requirement of Legislative Sobriety. Calabresi's second assumption, legislative sobriety, is also highly questionable. Nothing in democratic
theory requires that legislatures should act in a sober or considered manner.
When this is tied to the freedom of common law courts to act in a flexible and
political way, we are faced with a disturbing paradox. According to Calabresi,
while courts must in certain circumstances be directly reactive in the way in
which they address and resolve certain problems, the legislature's reaction to
majoritarian preferences is constrained by the demands of sober reflection.
Within the prevailing ideology of American democracy, it is surely the privilege of legislatures to perform in an arational, arbitrary, and partisan fashion,
if they so choose. 35 They are accountable and can be removed. Why is it, for
example, that the Connecticut legislature must act "soberly" in reconsidering
the death penalty or the antiabortion law (pp. 26-27)?36 What requires the
33. L. Tribe, supra note 11, at 896; F. Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, in Government under Law 6 (A.E. Sutherland ed. 1956); Rostow, The Supreme Court and
the People's Will, 33 Notre Dame Law. 573, 578 (1958). A curious bedfellow is 2 F.A. Hayek,
Law, Legislation and Liberty 6-7 (1976):
The whole history of the development of popular institutions is a history of continuous
struggle to prevent particular groups from abusing the governmental apparatus for the
benefit of the collective interest of these groups. This struggle has certainly not ended
with the present tendency to define as the general interest anything that a majority
formed by a coalition of organised interests decides upon.
See also 3 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty 3 (1979); A. Marwick, British Society Since
1945, at 268-69 (1982) ("As modern society has become more complex, so the balance of forces
behind political decision-making must become more complex.").
34. Minority laws may be precisely those that are out of fit with the legal fabric now, or were
out of fit when enacted. They may, nonetheless, be paradigmatic examples of statutes that were
intended to exercise, and do exercise, a strong gravitational pull.
35. Dworkin explains and criticizes how welfare economists, with whom Calabresi would be
associated as evidenced by his earlier work in torts, supra note 1, have constructed such a theory
to explain how individual preferences are translated into legislation by the institutions of representative democracy. Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-The Consequences of
Uncertainty, 6 J. Law &Ed. 3, 10 (1977). See also Kennedy, supra note 13, and Wellington, supra
note 27.
36. It has been argued that the Connecticut legislators were unwilling to risk political
disfavor by voting for repeal of their antiabortion law. See Berry, Spirits of the Past-Coping
with Old Laws, 19 U. Fla. L. Rev. 24, 28 (1966). Indeed, it has been suggested that "[t]here is
some evidence that ... many Connecticut legislators preferred to have the Court, rather than
themselves, make the decision to eliminate the statute." Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a
Doctrine, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 219, 219 n.2 (1965) (commenting on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
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Wisconsin legislators to take a "considered" stand on the review of their
contributory negligence statute (pp. 35-37)? No guidance or justification is
offered. Indeed, it can be argued with some plausibility and philosophical
punishment are emotive problems and should
support that issues like 3capital
7
be decided accordingly.
3. The Unavoidability of Legislative Inertia. Calabresi's third assumption, legislative inertia, while a fact of life, is by no means a fixed or unalterable one. Indeed, some might claim that such a state of legislative affairs is a
democratic choice, in the sense that it is within the power of the majority to
effect reform if it feels sufficiently moved. The fact that such "structural
reform" is not likely (p. 70) does not undermine this point. Calabresi asserts
that "to most people the unknowns of such reforms are too great" (p. 72).
Yet it is likely that, in realpolitik terms, popular response to the true "radical" nature of his thesis would be equally fearful. Given a candid choice
between judicial sunsetting and legislative reform, the electorate might well
opt for the latter. The open granting of even greater judicial power seems at
the very least contrary to the contemporary American political climate. It may
thus be objected that Calabresi's theory, while masquerading as deeply conservative, is as radical as structural reform of the legislative process would be.
B. The Legislative Timetable: A Separation-of-PowersProblem
Even accepting that legislative enactments represent majoritarian preferences only in a complex manner that attenuates the concept of "popular
sovereignty," it may nevertheless be argued that the judicial sunsetting approach is legitimate as a way of spurring the legislature to reconsider those
anachronistic statutes that it has not consciously chosen to leave unrevised.
Since, as to those statutes, legislative inertia is itself illegitimate, and since any
exercise of judicial sunsetting remains subject to legislative reconsideration,

U.s. 479 (1965)). The rather curious birth of the controversial Arkansas law, Ark. Stat. Ann. §
80-1663 (1947), which gave creation science equal school time with evolution science, points up
the potentially capricious and fanciful operation of legislatures. For instance, the law was drafted
by an x-ray technician, who was neither a lawyer nor a scientist. It went through the legislature on
the nod. Pro tern senate president, Ben Allen, felt that "it was meaningless, just a piece of junk,
so why not vote for it." Sunday Times (London), Dec. 13, 1981, at 13, col. 5. The state governor,
Frank White, admitted that he had signed the law without reading it. Furthermore, Judge
Overton's decision to strike down the law was greeted by the original sponsor of the Arkansas bill,
State Senator James L. Hoisted, as a triumph; the court case served to give national prominence
to the "creationist" issue. In this way, the legislative process was being used merely as an opening
gambit in a long-haul strategy. Such legislative performance was far from sober or considered.
Nevertheless, however lax or irresponsible it may have been, this cannot be condemned as
illegitimate or fraudulent. It is the process, as much as its manipulators, that is at fault.
37. Although currently viewed with professional disfavor, a prominent school of early
twentieth-century philosophy held that moral judgments were simply expressions of raw emotions. See A. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936); C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language
(1944). This view has been more recently championed by the Scandinavian legal theorist, Alf
Ross. He maintains that concepts of justice are merely constructs through which to buttress
emotional attitudes. In rather overblown terms, "[t]he ideology of justice is a militant attitude of
a biological-emotional kind, to which one incites oneself for the implacable and blind defence of
certain interests." A. Ross, On Law and Justice 275 (1959).
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the courts under such circumstances would assertedly not be acting undemo-

cratically. Calabresi defends the occasional allocation of the burden of legislative inertia to the courts on the basis that the courts are simply the least-worst

alternative agency. 38 But while Calabresi's argument that to maintain the
status quo is to accord legitimacy to legislative enactments that may now run

counter to majoritarian preferences is compelling, it fails to address a very
pressing practical consideration. At the very root of his thesis lies the fact that
legislative time is a precious commodity in the governmental process. It is a

scarce good. 39 Nevertheless, there is nothing in Calabresi's thesis that explains
the relative importance and priority of the various demands on legislative
time. What is it that makes an "obsolete" statute, which a court has by threat
or amendment invited the legislature to reconsider, worthy of promotion in

the legislative timetable to the exclusion of a major piece of policy-making, an
interest-group bill or a debate on topics of substantial community concern?

Indeed, as legislative time is a scarce good, there is already too little of it to
accommodate some of these matters. What is it in the act of judicial sunset-

ting that will galvanize a previously indifferent legislator to sponsor the
reform of such an "obsolete" statute? In effect, the response of the judicial

"temporary guardians" (p. 95) may frequently become the final solution. In
short, Calabresi fails to heed his own warning that "starting points may

become end points" (p. 52). The decision where to allocate the burden of
legislative inertia is equivalent to a reallocation of legislative power. As such it

amounts to a real shift in the balance of political power.
Recognition of this shift in the balance of political power undermines

Calabresi's summation of the democratic legitimacy and the appeal of his
thesis: "There is nothing in itself deeply inconsistent with democracy in the

delegation to a group of wise people of the job of setting the starting points,
so long as the polity can reject the decisions of its guardians which it dislikes"

(p. 95).40 The American brand of democratic government is but one manifes-

tation of the democratic ideal. 41 It draws its individual character from the

peculiarly American doctrine of separation of powers. At the nation's birth,
the American people agreed that over the long haul a system of "checks and

balances" was the best compromise through which to achieve a governable
38. For Calabresi's assessments of alternative approaches, see supra note 23.
39. Dworkin makes a similar point in the context of adjudication generally, when he states
that "[liegislative time is a scarce resource, to be allocated with some sense of political priorities,
and it may well be that a judicial decision would be overruled if Parliament had time to pass every
law it would like to pass, but will not be overruled because Parliament does not." Dworkin,
Political Judges and the Rule of Law, 64 Procs. Br. Acad. 259, 270 (1978).
40. Calabresi's view receives some support from a British politician:
I've always worked on the assumption that you can make democracy work by education
and communication: by enabling people to be not merely formal voters but active
participants, settling their own fortunes, taking part in collective decisions. But in this
country people don't want to take part in collective decisions .... What we now have is
mass-indifference and mass-alienation .

. .

. I now accept that the settled and just

management of society by a progressive oligarchy is probably the best we can hope for.
2 R. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister 779-80 (1976).
41. See M. Cappelletti and W. Cohen, Comparative Constitutional Law (1979).
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and stable society. Whereas a pure separation-of-powers doctrine allows no
interaction between the different spheres of government, the American doctrine requires each sphere to monitor the operations of the other branches to
ensure that their respective powers are not exceeded. 42 Calabresi justifiably
castigates those who hide behind "the myth of an absolute separation of
powers" (p. 178). Even the functional reading of the doctrine of separation of
powers that Calabresi urges must, however, preserve some division of responsibility. Of course, this does not prevent courts and legislatures from operating on "common ground ' 43 or with a degree of "interdependence [and]
reciprocity." ' 44 Yet, if the doctrine is not to be robbed of meaning, it must
prohibit the piracy of legislative power by the judicial branch. Within the
American constitutional ideology, the separation-of-powers doctrine is a restraining rather than a facilitating device. The doctrine must work to prevent
one branch's taking advantage of the structural infirmity of another. 45 Judicial aggrandizement cannot be allowed to thrive at the expense of legislatures
laboring under a bout of inertia. For better or worse, the courts, at least when
not acting as constitutional arbiters, are constrained by the separation-ofpowers doctrine. Their direct resort to popular will is precluded by the earlier
and more fundamental expression of that will in the notion of checks and
balances. Calabresi's thesis must be seen
for what it is: a radical shift in the
46
distribution of governmental powers.
IV.

RENTS IN THE FAB.ic

A. On Calabresi'sMethodology
The Calabresian thesis of judicial sunsetting falls squarely within a liberal
tradition that embraces and comprises some of the titans of American legal
scholarship.47 Like his intellectual predecessors, Calabresi seeks to address
and resolve the crucial tension between the competing demands of the need for
continuity and the desire for change; "[llaw must be stable and yet it cannnot
stand still.' '48 While a settled legal order is a vital feature of a platform for

42. See B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of The American Revolution 55-93 (1967); Nagel,
Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 661,
697-701 (1978).
43. Green, Separation of Governmental Powers, 29 Yale L.J. 369, 375 (1920).
44. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson J.,

concurring).
45. It can be argued, of course, that it is precisely when one branch is ailing that another
branch should come to its assistance. For instance, it may be thought that the condition of
legislative inertia is one that should oblige or encourage the judiciary to perform essential surgery

for the good of the nation. Although there is much to recommend this view in universal terms, it is
not an option that is available under the American scheme of government.
46. As Ely pithily notes, "[w]e may grant until we're blue in the face that legislatures aren't
wholly democratic, but that isn't going to make courts more democratic than legislatures." J.H.
Ely, Democracy and Distrust 67 (1980).

47. Yet, as Calabresi himself concedes, "[t]he existence of identifiable ancestors does not
guarantee legitimacy" (p. 91).
48. R. Pound, Interpretations of Legal History 1 (1923).
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social progress, such progress will inevitably necessitate changes in that legal
order. The task for the courts is to act consistently with the dictates of the

existing law, while keeping it, and its justification, up to date. The task of the
jurist is to explain and advise how the courts can effect such a delicate

operation. In tackling this essential dilemma, Calabresi draws upon an intellectual tradition whose basic beliefs and ideas rest upon the twin pillars of

rationality and consensus.
1. The Legal Fabric. With different emphases, writers such as Bickel,

Hart, Sacks, Wellington, and Dworkin have given their considerable academic
support to the view that the courts may keep the law up to date by resort to

conventional morality as revealed by the power of rational inquiry. American
society is dynamic and pluralistic, yet different values interact to form a

coherent, cohesive body of norms. For these writers, law comprises a great
warehouse of values that have been individually catalogued and systematically

shelved. During the course of business, values will shift in and out of the
warehouse in response to the quantity and quality of legal and social trade.

Apart from keeping a detailed inventory, the judge has to ensure that incoming values are "screen[ed] ' 49 and "sift[ed]" 50 so that the stock of values is not
contaminated by prejudice, bias, or passion. At any one time, however, the
experienced judge will be able to point to a value or set of values that is
appropriate to resolve a particular litigated dispute or be able to perform a
thorough stocktaking and present an exhaustive account of the totality of

values housed. Within such a general set-up, each writer holds a different view
both as to the raw materials from which such warehoused values are derived
and manufactured, and as to the ability of judges to fulfill their storekeeping

duties effectively.
For Calabresi, the existing legal fabric, 5' to use his own metaphor, "re-

flects underlying values of a people" (p. 98) and is a "good approximation[ ]
of one aspect of the popular will, of what a majority in some sense desires"

(p. 97). This fabric is woven from many different threads and strands: statutes, common law decisions, jury actions, administrative determinations and
scholarly criticisms. 52

49. Wellington, supra note 27, at 251.
50. R. Dworkin, supra note 22, at 255. See generally id. at 126, 240-58.
51. On one occasion he refers to this as being not only legal, but "social and legal topography" (p. 6).
52. In this regard, Calabresi constructs his fabric of conventional morality from much wider
sources than Dworkin and from much narrower sources than Wellington. While Dworkin simply
refers to the principles that best justify and explain the body of existing law, see R. Dworkin,
supra note 22, at 66-68, Wellington prefers to cull from a whole range of disparate and informal
sources, such as political speeches, legislative materials, public opinion polls and the media. See
Wellington, supra note 27, at 237. Calabresi falls rather unsatisfactorily between the two. Having
gone beyond the relative security and finiteness of formal legal sources, it is unclear why he should
confine his sources to scholarly critics. There seems no cogent reason for according greater weight
or influence to the thoughts of a Yale law professor than to the editor of the New York Times.
Indeed, the academic and critical nature of professorial responsibilities seems far removed from
familiarity with the popular will; moral philosophers and economists are not renowned for their
worldliness.
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2. The Problems With ConventionalMorality. The shortcomings ofthe
attempt to utilize conventional morality as a constraint on judicial endeavor to
keep the law up to date have been well rehearsed: lack of any genuine
consensus, impossiblility of reliable ascertainment, subjectivity of interpretation, and the like. All these criticisms are ably brought together by Ely53 who
mounts an irresistible attack on the consensus theorists. However, as Calabresi is quick to point out (p. 251 nn.2, 4 & 6), Ely's potent critique is directed
at constitutional adjudication. Indeed, Ely appears to sanction the resort to
conventional morality in nonconstitutional settings "where appeals to this sort
of filtered consensus may make sense." ' 54 Ely, however, justifies his tolerance
with a reason Calabresi cannot claim in his own support. Ely's rationale for
tolerating a resort to conventional morality is that in such contexts, the work
of the court is subject to reversal or alteration by the legislature; "Itihe court
is standing in for the legislature, and if it has done so in a way the legislature
does not approve, it can soon be corrected."'55 As the assumption of legislative
inertia lies at the base of Calabresi's thesis, this line of argument is not
available to him without undermining the validity of his whole thesis. Further,
he concedes as much, when he accepts the force of this argument in dismissing
the idea that judicial lawmaking is democratic because it is always "subject to
legislative or popular revision" (p. 92).
A more novel criticism, peculiar to Calebresi's thesis, is that the legal
fabric may be completely unreflective and unrepresentative of prevailing communal morality, even of a conservative brand. On the basis of his assumption
that a theory of judicial sunsetting is only required because of the reality of
legislative inertia, it might well be that the only thing preserving or holding the
present fabric in place is the legislative inertia itself. If legislative inertia could
be reduced or removed, the present fabric of the law might be fundamentally
changed by the gravitational force of the greater number of new statutes
enacted.
As to whether judges are capable of identifying and isolating conventional morality with absolute precision, Calabresi refuses to accept the philosophical rigor of Dworkin's work5 and prefers the more realistic assumption
of Wellington. 57 He maintains that to imagine that one right answer is always
forthcoming is to expect too much of judges. They should be sufficiently wellequipped to scan the fabric and to identify a selection of principles which will
exclude the majority of answers, yet still leave some room within which to
maneuver. 58 Calabresi is rather contradictory, however, as to the degree of
difficulty attached to such a judicial task. At times, he concedes that the
"multiplicity of sources and the confusion of the [fabric] make that task

53. J.H. Ely, supra note 46, at 63-69.

54. Id. at 68.
55. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
56. See R. Dworkin, supra note 22, at 279-90.

57. See Wellington, supra note 27, at 240-45.
58. See G. Calabresi & P. Bobbitt, supra note I, at 211 n.39, and Statutes at p. 255 n.37.
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extraordinarily hard" (pp. 100-01); at others, he claims that a change in the
fabric will most frequently occur as a result of "[a] combination of events,
decisions, and theories, . . . and usually in easily recognized ways" (p. 131
(emphasis added)). Surely, on this count, Dworkin has it right when he admits
that such a task, even when confined to the body of settled rules, is herculean
in its demands and only capable of being carried out by "a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen. ' ' 9
3. Treating Like Cases Alike. If reference to conventional morality is the
method by which the law is kept in line with contemporary trends and values,
Calabresi relies upon "the great vague principle of treating like cases alike"
(p. 165) as the perfect complement through which to ensure that any change
will be made only incrementally. Like Dworkin,6 0 Calabresi places great faith
in the power and efficacy of formal rationality and goes so far as to say that
"the fundamental role of common law courts is to keep like cases being
treated alike" (p. 86). Such a concept of formal justice is far from uncontroversial or universal in its appeal. 6' At the core of the concept is logic and
not fairness. It is a hollow principle which demands that a previous case
should be followed regardless of its substantive fairness. As Raz notes, "fairness, if it is relevant at all, requires that the bad argument should not be
applied to the new case." '6 2 This means that any bias in the law will be
exaggerated further and any injustice will be perpetuated. Indeed, in an earlier
article, Calabresi acknowledged not only the validity of this argument, but
also accepted that some bias did in fact exist in the law, albeit residual and
63
unintentional rather than pervasive and deliberate.

59. R. Dworkin, supra note 22, at 105.
60. Id. at 113-14. For a substantial critique of this principle, see Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 543-56 (1982).
61. See, e.g., C. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument 15-17 (1963);
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 237-43 (1971); Carr, The Concept of Formal Justice, 39 Phil. Stud.
211 (1981); D.N. MacCormick, Formal Justice and the Form of Legal Arguments, 6 Etudes de
Logique Juridique 103, 105-18 (1976).
62. Raz, Professor Dworkin's Theory of Rights, 26 Pol. Stud. 123, 135 (1978). Calabresi
refers to this criticism but makes no response (p. 195 n.26 and p. 293 n.2).
63. As Calabresi notes in his discussion of legal aid for the lower-middle classes:
There are those who would view the bulk of the legal system as precisely that kind of
subterfuge, designed to give the illusion of impartiality (in the sense of allocations by
acceptable rules) while effecting results totally biased toward those who are articulate or
who have the means to purchase articulateness. I am not of that viewpoint, but this
unwillingness on my part to see an evil motive does not mean that I cannot admit that, in
at least some areas, the legal system can, in fact, have results which are just as bad and
which might be cured, in part, if the goods involved were, at a substantial cost, made
free.
0. Calabresi, Access to Justice and Substantive Law Reform: Legal Aid for the Lower Middle
Class, in 3 Access to Justice 169, 187 (M. Cappelletti ed. 1979). See also Galanter, Why the
"Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc'y. Rev. 95
(1974); Hufstedler, The Future of Civil Litigation, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 753 (1980); Jacob, Black
and White Perceptions of Justice in the City, 6 Law & Soc'y Rev. 69 (1971).
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B. Applying Calabresi'sThesis
There are a number of problems that arise when Calabresi's thesis is put
into practice. Examining a judge's role in judicial sunsetting will help to
illustrate these problems.
1. Three Questions. A judge adopting Calabresi's advice would have to
confront and answer three separate, yet equally difficult and important,
questions:
(a) What does the pertinent statute say?;
(b) Does it fit the legal fabric at the time of the present litigation?; and
(c) If not, did it fit the legal fabric at the time of its enactment?
Although Calibresi provides an excellent account of the hazards of statutory interpretation and its appropriate use as a remedy for statutory obsolescence (pp. 31-44), he does not give any explicit instructions on what amounts
to a proper and legitimate interpretation within the context of judicial sensetting. His analysis of the lattery of interpretation serves as an unintended
criticism of the original and constructive part of his thesis: while acknowledging that "[w]ords do not interpret themselves" (p. 31), Calibresi offers only
vague and unspecific guidance as to how the words should be interpreted. Like
H-art-andSac-k-sheplea-ds-f6-r honesty and recognizes the difficulty of trying
to ascertain the original legislative intent. With enviable clarity, he outlines the
major approaches to interpretation and reports that "[tihere is no consensus
on what courts should be doing when they interpret statutes" (p. 214). Rather
surprisingly, he asserts that, "[flor the purpose of this book, it does not
matter which of various theories of interpretation is accepted" (p. 214). But it
does matter. Before any assessment can be made of the "fit" of any particular
statute, it is inescapably necessary to place some construction on the statute.
Without such guidance, Calabresi's whole theory is rendered unworkable.
Indeed, in a new world of judicial sunsetting, a completely different approach
will be required: judicial sunsetting will cast a long shadow over all aspects of
the courts' handling of statutes.
Only after some initial interpretation is given to the statute will a judge be
able to proceed to questions (b) and (c). The judge must determine not only
whether the statute "fits in the current legal fabric" (p. 129), but also whether
it fitted the legal fabric at the time of its enactment. The first point to note is
that such a double task imposes labors that not only would be beyond Hercules, but would stretch the energies of Zeus. For a writer whose strength lies in
his realistic and pragmatic outlook, Calabresi places an intolerable burden on
judges by asking them to picture the legal fabric at some time in the past.
Indeed, it is arguably impossible to look at the past except in the light of the
present; the past, or at least our view of it, is shaped by the intervening events
and developments. 5

64. H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 27, at 1148-1406.
65. This view of history has been advocated by no lesser figures than Edward Hallett Carr,
What is History 123 (1961), and Hugh Trevor-Roper, History and Imagination (1980). Gerda
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2. Overcoming Inertia. A judge who is able to decide that there is a lack
of fit between the statute and the current legal fabric must then assume the
burden of overcoming legislative inertia. According to Calabresi, at this stage,
a "guess . . .as to majoritarian wishes will inevitably be made" (p. 113) by
the judge. In making this guess, the court must be courageous enough not to
succumb to "the desire to fill out the legal framework" (p. 114), yet it must
not be so cavalier as to "stray too far from subservience to the [fabric],
though, because it is unsure of its capacity to gauge majoritarian support" (p.
121). For instance, Calabresi envisages an occasional situation in which the
court may believe that it "cannot define or feels it cannot evolve a new rule to
fit the landscape" (p. 156). In such a situation, Calabresi asserts, the court
may be justified in threatening to move to a rule that does not fit the judicial
landscape "to force the legislative hand" (p. 156). W---s-uch a temporary
hiatus may act as a possible but unlikely catalyst for legislative activity, 66 this
potential intermediate stage between abandoning an old statutory rule and
replacing it with a new judicial rule is a dangerous digression. Its existence can
be obviated by stipulating that the court must be sufficiently confident of its
ability to frame a new rule befoleit-can abandon the old rule: this would be a
necessary precondition that would have to be met before it could be claimed
that the "retentionist biashad been satisfactorily overcome. Indeed, it may
be argued that thef-p-rcess of determining and declaring that the old rule is out
of fit will, at the same time, reveal and make plain the nature of its replacement. If the court cannot define a new rule to fit the landscape, it is likely that
it failed adequately to perceive the landscape in the first place.
3. Thwarting Expectations. There is a further infirmity at large in the
Calabresian thesis. If a court holds a statute "obsolete" or out of phase, it
does violence to that statute. While it does not do the same violence that
Bickel suggested a holding of unconstitutionality does, with the courts
"thwart[ing] the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and
now, ' 6 7 violence it does. The will of the obsolete statute is not that of the here
and now, but of the there and then. Violence is done because the formal career
of a statute is determined not by the legislature that enacted it, but by the
unpredictable and unchartable forces of litigation, forces profoundly and

Lerner, describing the process as "history making," has argued recently that this is an inevitable
part of social existence:
History is the means whereby we assert the continuity of human life-its creation is one
of the earliest humanizing activites of homo sapiens.
But history is more than collective memory; it is memory formed and shaped so as
to have meaning. This process, by which people preserve and interpret the past, and then
reinterpret it in light of new questions, is "history making." It is not a dispensable
intellectual luxury; history-making is a social necessity.
Lerner, The Necessity of History and the Professional Historian, 69 J.Am. Hist. 7, 10 (1982). In
a different vein, Jean-Pierre Lehmann has expressed the sentiment in this way: "[A] sense of
reality is not necessarily an important vehicle of history." J. Lehmann, The Roots of Modern
Japan 16 (1982). See also supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
67. See A. Bickel, supra note 26, at 17.
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intrinsically nonmajoritarian. s Of course, litigation is but the very tip of the
dispute-resolution process. Consequently, the operation and "vitality" of a
statute must be gauged by the courts from a very unrepresentative sample of
disputes that arise under
the statute. Courts glimpse the world through the
69
keyhole of litigation.
Suffice it to emphasize that an obsolete statute, which does not fit the
legal fabric, is nonetheless a clear marker against which parties can make their
pitch. A legislative second-look judgment queers that pitch, even if temporarily, in a fashion that may do as much to defeat legitimate expectations as to
champion them. Although the device of prospective overruling is available
(pp. 279-80), "[t]he frightening difference between court action and political
action is that courts frequently give no warning." ' 70 A statute that is never
litigated may have as much gravitational pull on the field of litigation, and
hence the legal fabric, as the FELA or Jones Act. Yet it is the belief of at least
one party, both currently and even more so under the Calabresian regime, that
litigation will modify a rule of law in his favor. 7' It is not clear why the
updating of time-worn law should be left to the democratically and statistically unrepresentative forces of litigation.
This difficulty of frustrating legitimate expectations is compounded by
the inherent limitations in judicial vision. As Calabresi would admit, not every
judge is a Hercules who can grasp the intricate and detailed topography of the
legal landscape. Many a stocktaking has missed a vital component. Fulfilling
the primary judicial task (p. 113) depends on what the judge is looking for.
Each judge brings to this judgmental task some sense of what is right or wrong
for the country (p. 97). It may well be that most judges can fulfill the more
limited but yet Herculean survey of the legal landscape, such that a given
judge's "bizarre sense of values becomes relatively unimportant" (p. 97).
However, this is a gamble that litigants would have to be prepared to take,
and can offer no comfort to those whose legitimate expectations are involved
in litigation before that judge.
Further, the problem of technique, as Ely has pointed out, is one of
special importance here. It is as much a myth that courts can determine
whether a statute fitted when it was passed, or fits today, as it is a myth that
prescient courts can use the perceived values of tomorrow's majority in a

68. Many factors conjoin and interact to determine whether litigation occurs. Although these
determinants are extremely subtle and complicated, they can be reduced to four main types: sociopolitical, psychological, economic and legal. See Hutchinson, The Formal and Informal Schemes
of the Civil Justice System: A Legal Symbiosis Explored, 19 Osgoode Hall L. J.473 (1981).
69. P. Freund, quoted in Thomas, Have the Judges Done Too Much?, Time, Jan. 22, 1979,
at 91.
70. Neely, supra note 8, at 7.
71. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J.Legal Stud.
65 (1977); Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. Legal Stud. 51 (1977); Rubin,
Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. Legal Stud. 205 (1982); Priest, The Selective Characteristics
of Litigation, 9 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1980). See also Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common
Law Rules, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1717 (1982), for an argument directing attention towards legislative
and administrative arenas.
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value-neutral way. 72 As much as shaping the present by predicting the future,
courts will shape the present by interpreting the past. 73 To paraphrase Ely, by
interpreting the past, courts will inevitably help to shape our view of it. By
shaping the past, they will unavoidably shape the present. The fact that
Calabresi claims this is done in a conditional way should not count as a
defense. A judge can be as much a Nelson as a Hercules; a myopic or
imagined view of the past fit can lead to a profoundly nonmajoritarian
conclusion for the present.7 4 The reply that in the overall legal landscape one
judge can do little harm is unconvincing. If Calabresi is prepared to concede
that unprincipled judicial decisionmaking can occur, 75 not only does the
landscape become pitted with volatile and hidden landmines, it might be
mapped by an unreliable and mercurial topographer.
V. Weber Revisited
The recent case of United Steelworkers v. Weber7 provides a challenging
testing-ground for Calabresi's thesis and a forcing-ground for our own criticisms. The facts and decision in the case are sufficiently notorious to warrant
only a brief summary. 77 Brian Weber, a white employee of Kaiser Aluminum
& Chemical Corp., was rejected for an on-the-job craft-training program that
reserved half of its places for blacks. He sued Kaiser and his union, the United
Steelworkers of America. Although Weber was successful in two lower
courts,7 8 the Supreme Court, by a 5-2 majority, rejected his claim and held
that under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196479 employers were not
precluded from giving special job preferences to minorities. This was the first
case in which the Supreme Court had had to consider the legality of an
affirmative-action program voluntarily introduced by a private employer
without a judicial finding of past discrimination.80 In his new world of judicial

72. J.H. Ely, supra note 46, at 70. For a trenchant criticism see Dworkin, The Forum of
Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 469 (1981).
73. In the purely common law context, Henry Hart and John McNaughton have noted that
as regards precedents, "[a]t the moment of their making, they speak from the present to the
future. At the moment of their application, they speak out of the past to the present." Hart &
McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, Daedalus, Fall 1958, at 40, 41.
74. It will be remembered that, at the battle of Copenhagen, Admiral Horatio Nelson's
famous quip, "Really, Hardy, I see no signal," was delivered while holding his telescope to his
blind eye; a deliberate refusal by him to acknowledge the signal to retreat.
75. G. Calabresi & P. Bobbitt, supra note 1, at 211 n.39; Statutes at p. 256 n.37.
76. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
77. For substantive analyses see, e.g., Dworkin, How To Read the Civil Rights Acts, N.Y.
Rev. Books, Dec. 20, 1979, at 37; Neuborne, Observations on Weber, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 546
(1979); Note, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 243-54 (1979).
78. 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(d) (1976).
80. The Court had had occasion to consider past discrimination under title VII in a number
of earlier cases, notably McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-80 (1976),
where the question of whether title VII forbids private employers and unions from voluntarily
agreeing upon bona fide affirmative action plans that accord racial preference in the manner
contemplated in Weber had been expressly left open, id. at 281 n.8. See also International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 347-48 (1977); Franks v. Bowman
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sunsetting, how would Justice Crepusculum, our imaginary judicial alter ego
of Professor Calabresi, deal with this case if it arose in 1982?
The first problem that he would have to address would be "What does
the statute mean?""' In particular, he must decide what interpretation is to be

placed upon section 703(d), which states that "[i]t shall be ... unlawful...
for any employer ...

to discriminate against any individual."182 As the extent

of the disagreement between members of the Supreme Court in Weber revealed, the task of fixing section 703(d) with a working meaning is far from
straightforward. For instance Justice Brennan, giving the opinion of the
Court, argued that a literal reading of the words would violate the spirit of the
Act, 83 whereas Justice Rehnquist concluded, on the basis of the congressional

debates, that the section "prohibits all racial discrimination" 84 and took the
view that the majority went "not merely beyond, but directly against Title
VII's language and legislative history." 8 As each of the opinions demonstrates, and as Calabresi perspicaciously notes (p. 37), the interpretive exercise

Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 762 (1976) (both concerning retroactive seniority with affirmative
discrimination effects). See generally Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private
Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 905 (1978).
In the celebrated case of Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the
Court had considered affirmative action programs in the context of title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), and the fourteenth amendment. See R. Posner,
The Economics of Justice 387-407 (1981); A. Sindler, Bakke, De Funis, and Minority Admissions
(1978); Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 Cath. U. L. Rev. 427 (1979); Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723 (1974); Kaplan, Equal Justice
in An Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw U.L.
Rev. 363 (1966); Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and
the Judicial Role, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653 (1975); Symposium: Regents of the University of
Californiav. Bakke, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1979); Symposium on Reverse Discrimination, 90 Ethics
81 (1979); Note, The Use of Racial Preferences in Employment: The Affirmative Action/Reverse
Discrimination Dilemma, 32 Vand. L. Rev. 783 (1979).
81. Calabresi does not include this initial question in his thesis, but he is logically and
practically committed to such a prior inquiry, see supra text accompanying note 64. As Dworkin,
supra note 77, at 38 has noted:
There is no agreement about theories of legislation among American judges, or indeed
among judges of any developed legal system. On the contrary, the concept of legislation
figures in jurisprudence as what philosophers call a "contested" concept. Theories of
legislation are not themselves set out in statutes or even fixed by judicial precedent; each
judge must himself apply a theory whose authority, for him as for others, lies in its
persuasive force.
Although Calabresi surveys the possibilities, he offers little definite guidance.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1976).
83. 443 U.S. at 201. In pursuing such a line of interpretation, Brennan relied on Holy Trinity
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892): "[A] thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers." The dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Weber surveys the legislative history to
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 443 U.S. at 231-52.
84. 443 U.S. at 220.
85. Id. at 255 (emphasis in original). Rehnquist characterized the result arrived at by the
majority as being "a tour deforce reminiscent not of jurists such as Hale, Holmes and Hughes,
but of escape artists such as Houdini." Id. at 222. Calabresi would presumably see Weber as a
vindication of his criticisms of subterfuge in the interpretation process, doing violence to "the
core of honest interpretation" (p. 35) and reminiscent of what he then characterizes as Mr. Justice
Black's "misreading" in, for example, Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949) (pp. 207-08
n. 10).
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is fraught with hazards. With studied understatement, commentators have
asserted that "the Weber decision is difficult to reconcile with the language of
Title VIP' 86 and that "Weber was not a simple case to decide. ' 8 7 Nevertheless, before Crepusculum, J., can proceed to examine the "fit" of the statute,
he is required to give it some meaning. Further, it is not open to him to
interpret the words in the light of the fabric, for to do so would render the
need to consider the statute's "fit" otiose. Without a stratagem of statutory
interpretation, Calabresi's thesis will have serious difficulty in seeing the light
of day.
Assuming that Crepusculum, J., has given a meaning to the statute, the
next step will be to see if the statute "fits" the current legal fabric. The Civil
Rights Act, passed eighteen years ago, has only recently reached the age of
majority. While age is relevant, it is not conclusive. The Civil Rights Act,
although a statute, is no ordinary statute. It heralded a fundamental and
pervasive change in the legal and social order. Its objective was to effect a
major redesign of the existing fabric, which in 1964 did not adequately or
effectively control discrimination.88 As such, it was designed to exercise, and
has exercised, a much greater gravitational pull than other statutes. Unlike the
FELA and the Jones Act, which were much more discrete in their scope of
operation (pp. 32-33, 151-57), the impact of the Civil Rights Act ran through
every fiber of the fabric. However, its impact was felt in different ways in
different parts of the fabric. Some, such as Justice Brennan, believed that the
Act was part of a campaign to improve "the plight of the Negro in our
economy." 8 Others, such as Justice Rehnquist, maintained that the effect of
the Act was to prohibit all forms of discrimination." These contradictory
signals were also experienced in the academic sector of the fabric. 91 Consequently, even though the Civil Rights Act had a profound impact on the legal
fabric, while the strength of its gravitational pull was constant, its character
varied. As the opinions in Weber show, gauging the current legal fabric is an
extraordinarily difficult affair.9 2 Justice Blackmun, for instance, appreciated
the possibility of making an incorrect guess at this stage,! but comforted

86. Note, supra note 77, at 249.
87. Dworkin, supra note 77, at 37.
88. The need to recognize and confirm basic civil rights was formally accepted in the epochal
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In the decade preceding the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act, there was a maelstrom of legal and social activity. The Act of
1964 responded to and reflected these national concerns.
89. See 443 U.S. at 202.
90. Id. at 220.
91. See, e.g., I. Jenkins, Social Order and the Limits of Law 268-311 (1980); R. Posner,
supra note 80; Dworkin, supra note 77; Calabresi, supra note 80; and sources cited supra note 80.
92. In Bakke, which Posner describes as "not a source of much guidance for the future," R.
Posner, supra note 80, at 388, the Supreme Court held that while an explicit racial quota was
unacceptable, race could be used as one of several determinants of selection for a state medical
school. 438 U.S. 265, 272 (1978). In McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273
(1976), the question that arose for decision in Weber had been left open. It is against this legal
background that Crepusculum, J., would have to initiate an analysis, even before moving to
survey the critical literature on Bakke and Weber, see supra notes 77 & 80.
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himself with the thought that "if the Court has misperceived the political will,
it has the assurance that ... Congress may set a different course if it so

chooses." '9 3 As Calabresi's whole thesis is predicated on the fact of legislative
inertia, such a redirecting would rarely occur.
On the further assumption that Crepusculum, J., has gauged the fabric
and that a lack of fit is evident, he is obliged to step out into alien political
terrain and gather a sense of majoritarian preferences with regard to affirmative action programs. 94 The dangerous and frankly Jovian nature of this
expedition needs little comment. Indeed, this predicament is nicely caught in
the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger:
The Court reaches a result I would be inclined to vote for were I a
Member of Congress considering a proposed amendment of Title
VII. I cannot join the Court's judgment, however, because it is
contrary to the explicit language of the statute and arrived at by
means wholly incompatible with long-established principles of separation of powers. Under the guise of statutory "construction," the
Court effectively rewrites Title VII to achieve what it regards as a
desirable result. It "amends" the statute to do precisely what both
its sponsors
and its opponents agreed the statute was not intended to
5
do.9
Finally, if it is assumed that the interpreted statute does not fit, Crepusculum,
J., might be inclined to suggest or make an amendment of the Civil Rights
Act-a state of affairs that is entirely compatible with the theoretical dictates
of Calabresi's thesis. The political shockwaves that such a judicial response
would likely create would be little short of seismic. Although claiming to act
in the name and spirit of democracy, Crepusculum's radical judgment could
expect short shrift from the electorate. It is difficult to understand how the
Calabresian notion of democracy squares with its popular usage. Further,
congressional commendation of and connivance with this course of action is
hard to imagine.

93. 443 U.S. at 216 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Dworkin, supra note 77, at 37, observes that
the fact that Weber was concerned with the question of whether the plan was legal as opposed to
constitutional is unimportant:
If Congress disapproves a court decision interpreting a congressional statute, it can
always reverse the decision by changing the statute. It cannot reverse a decision that
interprets the Constitution. In the present circumstances, however, a Supreme Court
decision on the statutory legality of affirmative action programs is, as a practical matter,
almost as irreversible as a decision on their constitutional validity. It seems unlikely that
Congress would now pass legislation either explicitly condoning or explicitly forbidding
affirmative action in employment, at least so long as that issue remains politically as
volatile as it is now. So the Court's decision about the legal consequences of what
Congress has already done is likely to remain in force for some time, whatever that
decision is.
See also Note, Congressional Reversal of Supreme Court Decisions: 1945-1957, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
1324, 1337 (1958) ("[A] recognition of the unusual unanimity of interest and opinion which is
generally required to bring about a congressional reversal of a Supreme Court decision indicates
that reliance on legislative correction is rarely warranted." (emphasis added)).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
95. 443 U.S. at 216 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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VI. THE ECLIPSE OF THE JUDICIAL SUNSET
It is in the nature of reviews that the stance adopted is generally critical,
usually pedantic, and often persnickety. Yet fastidious attention to detail must
not be allowed to eclipse the overall thrust and originality of a book's central
idea. It would be methodologically misguided and intellectually unjust to
assess Statutes purely in terms of its formal attributes of precision, detail,
clarity, and exhaustiveness and to invalidate it on the basis of a single flaw or
counterexample. The enduring quality of a book is surely to be judged by "the
depth, the penetration, and the power of its central insight." '9 6 Although its
elaboration and refinement are technical and sophisticated, the central insight
of Calabresi's work is as simple as it is important, as profound as it is
provocative. The problem he addresses and the thesis he propounds transcend
the realms of academic discourse. As befits a scholar of Calabresi's stature,
his work touches fundamental issues that affect all citizens who take democracy seriously.
Our substantive criticisms of Calabresi's thesis, to the effect that it is
more radical than he is prepared to concede, are not to be taken as a condemnation of his proposal. A necessary prerequisite of any democratic choice is
that it be informed; that is, any person who is asked to make an important
choice ought to be made aware of the proper character and consequences of
the options available. A critical scrutiny of any option is a vital facet of such
information. The force of our critique has been to suggest that a choice for
judicial sunsetting is as radical as reform of the legislative process. Judicial
sunsetting would result in as basic a reallocation of power as Calabresi holds
would flow from legislative reform (pp. 70-71). While Calabresi's plea for
candor is wholeheartedly endorsed, he directs it at too restricted a category of
governmental actors. His is a plea for judicial candor; ours is a hope for
societal candor. The choice should not be one for the judges or legal community alone; the decision is one for the citizenry. Whether judges should be
empowered to amend legislation is an issue for society at large. Mindful of the
fact that judicial sunsetting is as deep a structural change as legislative reform,
the responsibility for choosing between these options must be borne by that
society. As Calabresi himself responds to the prospects of legislative reform, it
"is not to say that such deep reforms are undesirable. It is only to assert that
to most people the unknowns of such reforms are too great; if forced to the
choice, they prefer structural conservatism . . ." (p. 72 (emphasis added)).
Yet, the real magnitude of structural change entailed in judicial sunsetting
demands that such a choice be faced and made openly.
Democracy demands open and responsive government. If more than lipservice is to be paid to this constraint, the shift in political power implicit in
judicial sunsetting must be candidly presented to, and sanctioned by, the

96. R. Wolff, Understanding Rawls 7 (1977).
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electorate or its representatives. 9 7 It is for the governed to make an informed
choice. They must determine whether statutory obsolescence is a greater or
lesser evil than judicial sunsetting. They must decide whether the time is ripe
to bite the legislative bullet and commence a program, even if limited in scope,
to blow away the cloying dust of legislative inertia. Such structural reform
must not be embarked upon lightly, but the drastic condition of statutory
obsolescence requires drastic medicine. An ounce of legislative prevention is
better than a pound of judicial cure.

97. Davies's proposal for a Nonprimacy of Statutes Act would satisfy this criterion of
societal candor. See supra note 7. However, the reliance on a fixed life-span for individual statutes
is ill-suited to the complex problem of statutory obsolescence. See supra text accompanying notes
5-22. It has to be said that it is difficult to envisage anyone other than a lawyer proposing a theory
of judicial sunsetting; it is a peculiarly lawyerly solution to a general, systemic illness.

Calabresi: An Addendum
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES. By Guido Calabresi.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982. Pp. 319. $25.00.
Reviewed by Alfred Hill*
Professor Calabresi has written an exhilarating and exasperating book. A
full-scale review would be superfluous in view of the extensive discussion by
Hutchinson and Morgan in the foregoing pages. What is offered here is an
independent addendum.
Constitutional issues aside, Calabresi advances a proposal that is imaginative and sensible. His starting points are these: the problem of the obsolescence of statutes is becoming increasingly acute in our age of "statutorification" (pp. 1, 163); the nature of our legislative processes tends to hinder the
repeal or updating of obsolete statutes long after majoritarian support for
them has faded (even if majoritarian support is defined not in terms of the
popular will but more narrowly in terms of the probable outcome of a current
legislative vote on the particular statute) (p. 6); and courts are particularly
suited to determine whether a statute is indeed obsolete, or seemingly obsolete, by reference to whether it "fits" into, or is "out of phase" with, the
"legal landscape" (pp. 6, 121, 123, 166)-by which he means the dominant
features our law has assumed, in consequence essentially of both statutory and
judicial developments.'
Upon determining a statute to be obsolete, the role of the court would be
to "induce" (p. 116) or "force" (id.) legislative reconsideration. Inducing
legislative action might be accomplished by judicial threats. If these do not
suffice, or are deemed inappropriate, the court would "strike down" (p. 147)
the obsolete statute. It would then either substitute a rule of its own or a rule
adapted from a statute not deemed obsolete, or leave the area without a
substitute for the stricken rule, as circumstances require (pp. 147-48). Reenactment of the statute by the legislature would end the matter, because,
within constitutional limits, the legislature is entitled to the last word. If the
legislature does not re-enact the statute, there will have been accomplished the
judicial "sunsetting" (pp. 109, 117, 176) of an obsolete law that does not
command current legislative support.
This proposal is developed with great skill, marvelous clarity, and an
elaboration of argument that is almost always persuasive.

* Simon H. Rifkind Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. B.S. in S.S. 1937, C.C.N.Y.;
LL.B. 1941, Brooklyn Law School; S.J.D. 1957; Harvard Law School.
1. Calabresi would also have courts take account of "[sicholarly criticisms. .. ,jury actions
that nullify or mitigate past rules, even administrative determinations" (p. 98).
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But is it constitutional? This issue is first raised two-thirds of the way
through the book, where Calabresi states that he "cannot take a constitutional
objection very seriously" (p. 114). But it becomes apparent immediately that
this remark is predicated upon "explicit delegation by legislatures to courts of
the authority I have described" (id.). His argument in this connection is
summary but convincing: there would be no violation of separation-of-powers
doctrine because in essence the courts would be aiding rather than obstructing
the performance of the legislative function, and this at the behest of the
legislature itself.
Are courts to assume such a power without authorization from the
legislature? The treatment of this point is puzzling. Towards the end of the
book Calabresi asks the reader to assume, inter alia, that "[e]xplicit and
limiting legislative authorization for such a doctrine could be made a prerequisite to its use" (p. 167). But the reader asked to make this assumption is one
who is "not yet ... convinced that an open promulgation of the doctrine I
have been analyzing is appropriate" (id.). Earlier, Calabresi states that "[ilt
would obviously be infinitely preferable to have a legislative sanction for the
power" (p. 117). This remark is made in the course of discussion of the
constitutionality of the "doctrine"; and to say in this context that something
is "infinitely preferable" is to fall considerably short of saying that it is
indispensable. On the other hand, Calabresi also states that he deems the
validity of judicial "sunsetting" without legislative authorization to present a
"serious" (p. 116) problem that is "not ripe for discussion" (p. 117). Can he
possibly be asking courts to assume "sunsetting" authority prior to resolution
of this problem?
Hutchinson and Morgan, in their review in the foregoing pages, evidently
understand Calabresi to be advocating judicial "sunsetting" now, even without prior legislative authorization. Such a reading of the book is justifiable,
despite considerable ambiguity on the point. Calabresi states that courts have
been "sunsetting" obsolete statutes all along, albeit through "subterfuges,
fictions, and willful use of inappropriate doctrines" (p. 166)-specifically
through strained construction and dubious constitutional invalidation. 2 For
this reason, he says, "living with anachronistic statutes is not really an option" (p. 110). The only question for him is whether the judicial power to
"update" (pp. 120, 142) statutes shall be exercised deviously or "openly" (pp.
3
116, 161); and he repeatedly pleads for openness.
In the context of the book as a whole, it is not certain in most instances
that Calabresi is actually urging judicial "sunsetting" without authorization
from the legislature. It appears that his primary interest is in the development
of a model. His extensive discussion of the problem of legitimacy is devoted
for the most part to showing that the model is compatible with basic demo-

2. Thus he remarks on "the race to use equal protection doctrines to strike down laws that
are clearly constitutionally valid [and] the use of interpretations that would do honor even to the
greatest of casuists" (pp. 170-71).
3. See, e.g., pp. 115-17, 137-38, 144-45, 164-66, 180.
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cratic values. Most of his calls for "open"
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exercise by the judiciary of the

"sunsetting" function can be read simply as supportive of the model, without

any necessary implication that, from the constitutional point of view, the

model is ready for instant adoption by the courts. Yet there are some passages
that are difficult to interpret except as urging judicial arrogation of the

"sunsetting" function. 4 The reviewer initially balked at such an interpretaton

because of incredulity that this course could be contemplated without consid-

eration of the underlying constitutional problem. The incredulity was not
eliminated by Calabresi's remarks on this problem, which are set forth below

in their entirety (and which, in the book, follow immediately upon the discussion of the constitutionality of legislative delegation of the function to the

courts):
The question of whether the authority to allocate the burden of
inertia must be expressly granted by the legislatures to the courts or
can be arrived at by courts in a common law way is much more
serious. But to treat it adequately one would have to spend more
time than I wish to devote to it, and even then any conclusion would
be premature.
First, one would have to develop a far more complete theory of
when common lawmaking is appropriate than I can hope to do in
this book. One would then have to analyze whether the indirect
behavior (the subterfuges by courts and hints by legislatures) which
had occurred to date would justify the courts in proclaiming as a
doctrine what they could demonstrate had already occurred through
the accretion of decisions and statutes. One would have to see, in
other words, whether the gravitational field, which a theory of
common lawmaking required, had become strong enough to permit
this doctrine to be announced as an independent rule, which could in
turn start exercising its own gravitational force; or if, instead, the
field exerted a force sufficient to permit courts to act over statutes,
but only if they continued to do so by indirection and subterfuge.
I prefer to get on with the task of beginning a consideration of
the limits and techniques appropriate to the judicial role I have been
describing. That courts, in a common law way, have come to the
point of exercising the authority here described through fictions,
subterfuges, and indirection is, I think, manifest. Whether that way
of dealing with the authority is more desirable than an open acknowledgment of the power will be discussed in the last part of the
book. Whether it is then permissible for courts to make that declaration themselves or necessary to wait for a legislative sanction seems
to me not ripe for discussion.

4. Thus, he states at p. 166:
If the courts and legislatures openly accept this common law function as appropriate to the age of statutes, they will be recognizing some significant changes in our legalpolitical system. But they will only be recognizing the changes, not making them. The
statutorification and the concomitant tendency toward obsolescence of American law
have already occurred. So have the judicial reactions to these changes. What remains to
be done is only the taking of the last step, the seeing of the world as it is, and the giving
of a name to what is already happening in indirect and often careless ways.
See also p. 117, quoted in the text.
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It would obviously be infinitely preferable to have a legislative
sanction for the power. And under some justifications of judicial
lawmaking it would be essential. (The straight-delegation theory is
but the most obvious example.) And it is not clear that legislatures,
if presented with the doctrine as a form of limited sunsetting, would
necessarily freeze it. Senator Davies, for example, is optimistic
about the enactment of his broad bill. This by itself would argue for
waiting and seeing before urging any judicial declaration of the
rule-even if one were to conclude that such a "common law"
declaration could be appropriately made. To reach such a dubiously
second-best conclusion before it is clearly needed would seem hasty.
Perhaps, in other words, the very suggestion that a problem
currently exists will suffice to force the agenda in some legislatures.
If enough legislatures act, that fact might itself strengthen the argument for common law adoption of the doctrine elsewhere. In the
circumstances, a premature analysis of whether the courts could, in
the absence of legislative action, declare the power themselves seems
wasteful and even misguided. (Pp. 116-17) (footnotes omitted).
Preliminarily, it may be observed that when Calabresi speaks at the outset
of judicial authority "to allocate the burden of inertia," he means authority
to determine whether legislative reconsideration should be compelled in the
particular case-in effect to determine whether the continued life of a statute
shall depend on successful efforts within the legislature by the statute's opponents or proponents. Another preliminary point is that the quoted language
makes no express reference to the federal and state constitutions. Indeed,
Calabresi seems to suggest that no more is needed to solve the problem of
legitimacy than a suitable "theory of common lawmaking." But it will be
assumed that he understands full well that the scope of the judicial power visa-vis the legislature cannot be defined save in constitutional terms-that a
constitutional issue of the most fundamental kind is posed if courts are to
"strike down" legislative enactments solely on the ground that the courts
deem them obsolete. For that matter, subject to valid authorizations and
constraints by the legislature, the scope of the judicial power generally is at
bottom a constitutional question.
These preliminaries aside, it should be noted that Calabresi is not content
with saying that the problem of constitutionality (we shall use that term even
if he does not) is a "serious" one that is "not ripe for discussion." The last
paragraph advises that "premature analysis" of the problem would be
"wasteful and even misguided." Why? Because if enough legislatures delegate
"sunsetting" authority to the courts, "that fact might itself strengthen the
argument for common law adoption of the doctrine elsewhere." Presumably
Calabresi means that if there is sufficient legislative action of the indicated
kind, the "legal landscape" will have changed to the point where courts may
deem themselves justified in assuming "sunsetting" power on their own-and
that this process should not be inhibited by "premature" speculation about
constitutional obstacles. But will courts act constitutionally if they proceed in
this fashion? The answer, we are told in the second paragraph, will depend on
a "theory" yet to be developed.
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It is hard to know what to make of all this. A strong case has been
presented for legislative delegation of "sunsetting" authority to the courts. If
there should be no significant movement in this direction, as seems likely, this
will stem less from a perceived lack of merit in the proposal than from
opposition by pressure groups of the left, right, and center, each concerned
that its own treasured statutes could be doomed by judicial verdicts of obsolescence. As for the problem of judicial "sunsetting" without legislative
authorization, this is treated with a casualness that is surprising in a scholar as
able and serious as Calabresi.
The writer will venture some comments that are obvious to the point of
banality. The evolution of the common law was long dominated by the myth
that judges do not make law but simply apply it. For this reason among
others, old doctrine was eroded through strained applications of precedent
and other distortions, until it became apparent that a particular old doctrine
had been supplanted by a new one, which was then proclaimed "openly." The
common law still evolves largely in this fashion, and we deem the result to be
valid because, by hypothesis (as it now seems to us), the area is one in which
there is judicial competence to make law.
But if courts have in fact resorted to "subterfuges" and "fictions" in the
reformulation or elimination of statutes deemed by them to be obsolete, this
has not been by reason of a myth of lack of judicial lawmaking power, but
rather by reason of the constitutional principle of legislative supremacy. The
courts cannot claim validity for the "open" proclamation of new doctrine
that they lack constitutional power to make in the first place. The courts
cannot say, "We have the constitutional power to strike down statutes that we
deem obsolete, as evidenced by the fact that we have long been doing precisely
such a thing by indirection"-or at least they should not be urged to say this. 5
"Subterfuges" and "fictions" are Calabresi's terms. They are epithets,
and should not be used loosely. Past constructions and persistent modes of
construction acquire a legitimacy of their own. This is particulary true with

5. My colleague Bruce Ackerman has suggested a conceivable way out of this impasse-

namely, that it may be possible to develop a theory for justifying judicial "sunsetting" on the
basis of a rebuttable inference of legislative consent, drawn from a prolonged period of legislative

silence.
Assuming that this approach to the problem may be warranted in cases of desuetude, it
hardly seems warranted as to statutes that are very much alive, and that, from Calabresi's
viewpoint, ought to be "sunsetted" precisely because, being "out of phase," they produce results
violative of "the great vague principle of treating like cases alike" (p. 165). Consider some of
Calabresi's favorite candidates for "sunsetting": workmen's compensation statutes (because of
their inadequate payment schedules) and automobile guest statutes. Such laws, which affect
people adversely every day, presumably have opponents as well as supporters. Even if the
supporters are relatively weak, in the sense that they would not be able to persuade a current
majority of the legislators to vote for these laws, it is fair to assume, in the circumstances, that
they are strong enough to prevent legislative reconsideration. As Calabresi observes, all sorts of
bottlenecks have been deliberately built into our legislative systems. Judicial decrees that bypass
these bottlenecks by forcing items on the legislative agenda cannot realistically be justified in
terms of legislative consent. More fundamentally, they would constitute improper intrusions by
the judiciary into political processes established by constitutions and statutes, and by the rules
under which our legislatures have chosen to govern themselves.
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respect to constitutional interpretation; thus few would take seriously a suggestion that the first amendment should now be read as a limitation on only
federal governmental action. And this is also true to a large extent on the
legislative level; for example, a court today is most unlikely to give other than
an exceedingly narrow construction to an automobile guest statute. To be
sure, this does not explain or justify initial constructions or modes of construction that arguably misread statutory text, or arguably stretch constitutional doctrine as a device for invalidation. But even after account is taken of
the gaping character of this omission, it is submitted that the violence done to
statutes through what Calabresi chooses to call "subterfuges" and "fictions"
has the legitimacy of Holy Writ, compared with the legitimacy of Calabresi's
notion of judicial "sunsetting" without legislative authorization-if that is
indeed his notion.

